We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the long-run average of the rewards. The value is the maximal expected payoff that player 1 can guarantee against all strategies of player 2. We consider the computation of the set of states with value 1 under finite-memory strategies for player 1, and our main results for the problem are as follows: (1) we present a polynomial-time algorithm; (2) we show that whenever there is a finite-memory strategy, there is a stationary strategy that does not need memory at all; and (3) we present an optimal bound (which is double exponential) on the patience of stationary strategies (where patience of a distribution is the inverse of the smallest positive probability and represents a complexity measure of a stationary strategy).
1 Introduction 1 δ(a) | δ(a) > 0}. Concurrent game structures. A (two-player) concurrent stochastic game structure G = (S, A, Γ 1 , Γ 2 , δ) consists of the following components.
• A finite state space S and a finite set A of actions (or moves).
• Two move assignments Γ 1 , Γ 2 : S → 2 A \ ∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignment Γ i associates with each state s ∈ S the non-empty set Γ i (s) ⊆ A of moves available to player i at state s. For technical convenience, we assume that Γ i (s) ∩ Γ j (t) = ∅ unless i = j and s = t, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2} and s, t ∈ S. If this assumption is not met, then the moves can be trivially renamed to satisfy the assumption.
• A probabilistic transition function δ : S ×A×A → D(S), which associates with every state s ∈ S and moves a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) a probability distribution δ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ D(S) for the successor state.
For a set Q ⊆ S of states we will denote by Q = S \ Q the complement of Q. We will denote by δ min the minimum non-zero transition probability, i.e., δ min = min s,t∈S min a 1 ∈Γ 1 (s),a 2 ∈Γ 2 (s) {δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) | δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) > 0}. We will denote by n the number of states (i.e., n = |S|), and by m the maximal number of actions available for a player at a state (i.e., m = max s∈S max{|Γ 1 (s)|, |Γ 2 (s)|}). We will later define Markov chains as games where m = 1. Since finding the mean-payoff of Markov chains can be done in polynomial time, we will only consider the case where m ≥ 2. For all states s ∈ S, moves a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), let Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) = Supp(δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )) denote the set of possible successors of s when moves a 1 and a 2 are selected. The size of the transition relation of a game structure is defined as |δ| = s∈S a 1 ∈Γ 1 (s) a 2 ∈Γ 2 (s) |Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 )|.
One step probabilities. Given a concurrent game structure G, a state s, two distributions ξ 1 ∈ D(Γ 1 (s)) and ξ 2 ∈ D(Γ 2 (s)), the one step probability transition for a set U of states, denoted as δ(s, ξ 1 , ξ 2 )(U ) is a 1 ∈Γ 1 (s),a 2 ∈Γ 2 (s),t∈U δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) · ξ 1 (a 1 ) · ξ 2 (a 2 ). Often we will consider the distribution of player 2 to be a single action, i.e., ξ 2 (a 2 ) = 1 for an action a 2 , and then use the notation δ(s, ξ 1 , a 2 ). We will also write Succ(s, ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) = a 1 ∈Supp(ξ 1 ),a 2 ∈Supp(ξ 2 ) Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) for the set of possible successors under the distributions. Turn-based stochastic games, turn-based deterministic games and MDPs. A game structure G is turnbased stochastic if at every state at most one player can choose among multiple moves; that is, for every state s ∈ S there exists at most one i ∈ {1, 2} with |Γ i (s)| > 1. A turn-based stochastic game with a deterministic transition function is a turn-based deterministic game. A game structure is a player-2 Markov decision process (MDP) if for all s ∈ S we have |Γ 1 (s)| = 1, i.e., only player 2 has choice of actions in the game, and player-1 MDPs are defined analogously.
Plays. At every state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses a move a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s), and simultaneously and independently player 2 chooses a move a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s). The game then proceeds to the successor state t with probability δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t), for all t ∈ S. A path or a play of G is an infinite sequence ω = (s 0 , a 0 1 , a 0 2 ), (s 1 , a 1 1 , a 1 2 ), (s 2 , a 2 1 , a 2 2 ) . . . of states and action pairs such that for all k ≥ 0 we have (1) s k+1 ∈ Succ(s k , a k 1 , a k 2 ); and (2) a k 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s k ); and (3) a k 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s k ). We denote by Ω the set of all paths. Strategies. A strategy for a player is a recipe that describes how to extend prefixes of a play. Formally, a strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a mapping σ i : (S × A × A) * × S → D(A) that associates with every finite sequence x ∈ (S × A × A) * of state and action pairs, and the current state s in S, representing the past history of the game, a probability distribution σ i (x · s) used to select the next move. The strategy σ i can prescribe only moves that are available to player i; that is, for all sequences x ∈ (S × A × A) * and states s ∈ S, we require that Supp(σ i (x · s)) ⊆ Γ i (s). We denote by Σ i the set of all strategies for player i ∈ {1, 2}. Once the starting state s and the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 for the two players have been chosen, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined [27] , where an event A ⊆ Ω is a measurable set of paths. For an event A ⊆ Ω, we denote by Pr σ 1 ,σ 2 s (A) the probability that a path belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players use the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 . We denote by E σ 1 ,σ 2 s where pat(σ i (s)) is the patience of the distribution σ i (s). A strategy is pure (deterministic) if it does not use randomization, i.e., for any history there is always some unique action a that is played with probability 1. A pure stationary strategy σ i is also called a positional strategy, and represented as a function σ i : S → A. We denote by Σ S i the set of stationary strategies for player i.
Strategies with memory and finite-memory strategies.
A strategy σ i can be equivalently defined as a pair of functions (σ u i , σ n i ), along with a set Mem of memory states, such that (i) the next move function σ n i : S × Mem → D(A) given the current state of the game and the current memory state specifies the probability distribution over the actions; and (ii) the memory update function σ u i : S × A × A × Mem → Mem given the current state of the game, the action pairs, and the current memory state updates the memory state. Any strategy can be expressed with an infinite set Mem of memory states, and a strategy is a finite-memory strategy if the set Mem of memory states is finite, otherwise it is an infinite-memory strategy. We denote by Σ F i the set of finite-memory strategies for player i.
Absorbing states.
A state s is absorbing if for all actions a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and all actions a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) we have Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) = {s}. In the present paper we will also require that |Γ 1 (s)| = |Γ 2 (s)| = 1 if s is absorbing.
Objectives.
A quantitative objective Φ : Ω → R is a measurable function. In this work we will consider limit-average (or mean-payoff) objectives. We will consider concurrent games with a reward function r : S × A × A → [0, 1] that assigns a reward value r(s, a 1 , a 2 ) for all s ∈ S, a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s). For a path ω = (s 0 , a 0 1 , a 0 2 ), (s 1 , a 1 1 , a 1 2 ), . . . , the limit-inferior average (resp. limit-superior average) is defined as follows: LimInfAvg(ω) = lim inf n→∞ 1 n n−1 i=0 r(s i , a i 1 , a i 2 ) (resp. LimSupAvg(ω) = lim sup n→∞ 1 n n−1 i=0 r(s i , a i 1 , a i 2 )). For the analysis of concurrent games with Boolean limit-average objectives (with rewards 0 and 1 only) we will also need reachability and safety objectives. Given a target set U ⊆ S, the reachability objective Reach(U ) requires some state in U be visited at least once, i.e., defines the set Reach(U ) = {ω = (s 0 , a We also consider the eventual safety objective, namely coBüchi objective, that requires for a given set F that ultimately only states in F are visited, i.e., Observe that reachability objectives are a very special case of Boolean reward limit-average objectives where states in U are absorbing and are exactly the states with reward 1, and similarly for safety objectives.
Markov chains.
A game structure G is a Markov chain if m = 1. We will in that case write δ(s) for the distribution δ(s, a 1 , a 2 ), where a 1 is the unique action in Γ 1 (s) and a 2 is the unique action in Γ 2 (s). Markov chains defines a weighted graph (S, E, w), where (s, s ′ ) ∈ E iff δ(s)(s ′ ) > 0 and for all (s, s ′ ) ∈ E we have that w((s, s ′ )) = δ(s)(s ′ ). For an event A ⊆ Ω, we denote by Pr s (A) the probability Pr σ 1 ,σ 2 s (A), where σ 1 and σ 2 are the unique strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively. A state s is reachable from another state s ′ iff s ′ is reachable from s in (S, E, w). A set of states Z is reachable from a state s iff a state in Z is reachable from s. For any set of states Z in a Markov chain, let R S (Z), be the set of states from which Z is not reachable. Clearly, R S (Z) ⊆ (S \ Z). A set of states L is called a recurrent class if for each pair of states s, s ′ ∈ L we have that s ′ is reachable from s and for each pair of states s ∈ L and s ′′ ∈ (S \ L) we have that s ′′ is not reachable from s. A recurrent class in a Markov chain is a bottom scc (strongly connected component) in the graph of the Markov chain, where a bottom scc L is an scc with no edges leaving the scc. Properties of Markov chains to be explicitly used in proofs. We will use several basic properties of Markov chains in our proof and we explicitly state them here. Let us fix a Markov chain with state space S.
1. Given a set Z ⊆ S, for all s ∈ S, with probability 1 either Z is visited infinitely often or R S (Z) is reached.
2. Given Z ⊆ S, for all s ∈ S, with probability 1 R S (Z) or Z is reached, i.e., Pr s (Reach(R S (Z)∪Z)) = 1.
3. Given sets Z ⊆ S and Z ′ ⊆ S, such that Z can only be left from (Z ′ ∩ Z), then for all s ∈ Z with probability 1 (R S (Z ′ ) ∩ Z) or (Z ′ ∩ Z) is reached, i.e., Pr s (Reach((R S (Z ′ ) ∩ Z) ∪ (Z ′ ∩ Z))) = 1. Note the similarity with the previous property, only intersection with Z is taken.
4. Given sets Z ⊆ S and Z ′ ⊆ S, such that Z can only be left from (Z ′ ∩ Z) and from each state in (Z ′ ∩ Z) there is a positive probability to leave Z, then for all s ∈ Z with probability 1 (R S (Z ′ ) ∩ Z) or (S \ Z) is reached, i.e., Pr s (Reach((R S (Z ′ ) ∩ Z) ∪ (S \ Z))) = 1.
5. From every state s ∈ S, with probability 1 some recurrent class L is reached; and given a recurrent class L is reached, with probability 1 every state in L is reached.
6. Consider Z ⊆ S and Z ′ ⊆ S such that for all z ∈ Z the set Z ′ is reachable. Then for all s ∈ S with probability 1 either
8. Consider Z ⊆ S and Z ′ ⊆ S such that for all s ∈ Z the set Z ′ is reachable. Then for all s ∈ Z with probability 1 (S \ Z) or Z ′ is reached, i.e., Pr s (Reach((S \ Z) ∪ Z ′ )) = 1.
We will refer to these properties as Markov property 1 to Markov property 8, respectively. µ-calculus. Consider a µ-calculus expression Ψ = µX.ψ(X) over a finite set S, where ψ : 2 S → 2 S is monotonic. The least fixpoint Ψ = µX.ψ(X) is equal to the limit lim k→∞ X k , where X 0 = ∅, and X k+1 = ψ(X k ). For every state s ∈ Ψ, we define the level k ≥ 0 of s to be the integer such that s ∈ X k and s ∈ X k+1 . The greatest fixpoint Ψ = νX.ψ(X) is equal to the limit lim k→∞ X k , where X 0 = S, and X k+1 = ψ(X k ). For every state s ∈ Ψ, we define the level k ≥ 0 of s to be the integer such that s ∈ X k and s ∈ X k+1 . The height of a µ-calculus expression γX.ψ(X), where γ ∈ {µ, ν}, is the least integer h such that X h = lim k→∞ X k . An expression of height h can be computed in h + 1 iterations. A µ-calculus formula with nested µ and ν operators is a very succinct description of a nested iterative algorithm. Interpretation of µ-calculus formula. Consider a µ-calculus formula
where f is pointwise monotonic. can be interpreted as a function g(Y ) on Y , and the outer fixpoint computes the greatest fixpoint of g. The interpretation for computation of µY.νX.[f (Y, X)] is similar, and is extended straightforwardly to more nested µ-calculus formula.
The value problem. Given an objective Φ, and a class C of strategies for player 1, the value for player 1 under the class C of strategies is the maximal payoff that player 1 can guarantee with a strategy in class C. Formally, val(Φ, C)(s) = sup
. In this work we will consider the computation of the value 1 set under finite-memory strategies, i.e., the computation of the set {s ∈ S | val(LimInfAvg(r), Σ F 1 )(s) = 1}. Observe that to ensure value 1, player 1 must ensure that for all ε > 0, the probability to visit reward 1 is at least 1 − ε, and hence it follows if all rewards less than 1 are decreased to 0 the value 1 set still remains the same, and hence for simplicity for the value 1 set computation we will consider Boolean reward functions.
The Value 1 Set Computation
In this section we will present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the value 1 set, val 1 (Φ, Σ F 1 ), for mean-payoff objectives Φ. We start with a very basic and informal overview of the algorithm.
Basic overview of the algorithm. The algorithm will compute the value 1 set W by iteratively adding chunks of states that are guaranteed to be in the value 1 set, and the iteration will finally converge to W . Let U ⊆ W be the set of states that are already guaranteed to be in the value 1 set (already identified as subset of W in some previous iteration). Then a new chunk X of states are added such that U ⊆ X ⊆ W , and the new chunk of states are also added iteratively (the algorithm is a nested iterative algorithm). For the set X, let U ⊆ Y ⊆ X be the subset that is already added, and then a new chunk Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X is added such that player 1 can ensure that one of the following three conditions hold: (1) the probability to reach U in one step can be made arbitrarily large as compared to the probability to leave W in one step (then U can be reached with probability arbitrarily close to 1); or (2) the probability to stay in X in one step is 1 and the probability to reach Y in one step is positive (then Y can be reached with probability 1); or (3) the probability to stay in X in one step is 1, the one step expected reward and the probability to stay in Z in one step can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Figure 2 , Figure 3 , and Figure 4 illustrate the above three conditions, respectively, pictorially. Very informally, if always one of the the last two conditions is satisfied, then then the mean-payoff can be made arbitrarily close to 1; and the first condition ensures that the already computed value 1 set can be reached with probability arbitrarily close to 1. The initialization of the sets are as follows: U and Y are initialized to the empty set, and W , X, and Z are initialized to the set of all states. Note that the above three conditions are local (one-step) conditions and we will first define an one-step predecessor operator to capture the above conditions. We will then show how to compute the one-step predecessor operator in polynomial time, and finally show how to use the one-step predecessor operator in a nested iterative algorithm to compute the value 1 set in polynomial time.
One-step predecessor operator
We first formally define the one-step predecessor operator that was described informally in the basic overview of the algorithm. Given a state s and two distributions ξ 1 ∈ D(Γ 1 (s)) and ξ 2 ∈ D(Γ 2 (s)), the expected one-step reward ExpRew(s, ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) is defined as follows: a 1 ∈Γ 1 (s),a 2 ∈Γ 2 (s) ξ 1 (a 1 ) · ξ 2 (a 2 ) · r(s, a 1 , a 2 ). We often use distributions for player 2 that plays a single action a 2 with probability 1, and use a 2 to denote such a distribution. For sets U ⊆ Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ⊆ W , the one-step predecessor operator for limit-average (mean-payoff) objectives, denoted as LimAvgPre(W, U, X, Y, Z), is the set of states s such . . that for all 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , there exists a distribution ξ ǫ 1 over Γ 1 (s) such that for all actions a 2 in Γ 2 (s), we have that
We denote the above conditions as Equation 1, Equation 2, and Equation 3, respectively. Also our nested iterative algorithm (as informally described) that uses the LimAvgPre(W, U, X, Y, Z) operator will ensure the required inclusion U ⊆ Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ⊆ W . Before presenting the algorithm for the computation of the LimAvgPre set, we first discuss the special case when we only have the first condition Equation 1, then describe some key properties of witness distributions, and finally present an iterative algorithm to compute LimAvgPre.
The LPre operator and witness parametrized distribution. An algorithm for the computation of the predecessor operator (called the LPre operator) for reachability games was presented in [13] where only Equation 1 is required to be satisfied. We extend the results of [13, 9] to obtain the following properties (details presented in technical appendix):
• (Input and output). The algorithm takes as input a state s, two sets U ⊆ W of states, two sets of action sets A 1 ⊆ Γ 1 (s) and A 2 ⊆ Γ 2 (s), and either rejects the input or returns the largest set A 3 ⊆ A 2 such that the following conditions hold: for every 0 < ǫ < 1 2 there exists a witness distribution ξ ǫ 1 ∈ D(A 1 ), with patience at most
, such that (i) for all actions a 2 ∈ A 3 Equation 1 is satisfied;
and (ii) for all actions a ′ 2 ∈ (A 2 \ A 3 ) we have Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a ′ 2 ) ⊆ W . The set A 3 is largest in the sense that if A 4 ⊆ A 2 and A 4 satisfies the above conditions, then A 4 ⊆ A 3 . Notice that this indicates that for all a 2 ∈ (A 2 \ A 3 ) we have Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 ) ∩ U = ∅, because otherwise a 2 would be in A 3 . Moreover, the distribution ξ ǫ 1 has the largest possible support, i.e., for all actions a 1 ∈ (A 1 \ Supp(ξ ǫ 1 )), there exists an action a 2 in (A 2 \ A 3 ) such that Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) ∩ W = ∅. An input would only be rejected if for each action a 1 ∈ A 1 there exists an action a 2 ∈ A 2 such that Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) ∩ W = ∅.
• (Parametrized distribution). Finally, the witness family of distributions ξ ǫ 1 , for 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , is presented in a parametrized fashion as follows: the support Supp(ξ ǫ 1 ) for all 0 < ǫ < 1 2 is the same (denoted as A * ), and the algorithm gives the support set A * , and a ranking function that assigns a number from 0 to at most |A * | to every action in A * , and for any 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , the witness distribution ξ ǫ 1 plays actions with rank i with probability proportional to ǫ i . In other words, the support set A * and the ranking number of the actions in A * is a polynomial witness for the parametrized family of witness distributions ξ ǫ 1 , for all 0 < ǫ < 1 2 .
We summarize the important properties which we explicitly use later: LPre(s, W, U, A 1 , A 2 ) for U ⊆ W returns the following (see Technical Appendix for correctness proof):
1. (Reject property of LPre). Reject and then for all a 1 ∈ A 1 there exists a 2 ∈ A 2 such that
(Accept properties of LPre). Accepts and returns the set A 3 ⊆ A 2 and a parametrized distribution ξ ǫ 1 , for 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , with support Supp(ξ ǫ 1 ) ⊆ A 1 , such that the following properties hold:
• (Accept property a). For all a 2 ∈ A 3 , the distribution ξ ǫ 1 satisfies Equation 1 for a 2 .
• (Accept property d). The set A 3 is largest in the sense that for all a 2 ∈ (A 2 \ A 3 ) and for all parametrized distributions ξ ǫ 1 over A 1 , the Equation 1 cannot be satisfied, while satisfying actions in A 2 using
One action with large probability property. We will now show that if a state belongs to LimAvgPre, then there is a family of witness distributions where one action a is played with very large probability. Proof. Given 0 < ǫ ≤ δ min m , let ξ ǫ 1 be a witness distribution such that for all actions in Γ 2 (s) at least one of the three conditions for LimAvgPre is satisfied. Let C 1 be the set of actions a 2 in Γ 2 (s) such that ξ ǫ 1 and a 2 satisfy Equation 1; respectively, C 2 for Equation 2, and C 3 for Equation 3 . Let a be some action such that ξ ǫ 1 (a) ≥ 1 m (note that such an action must exist). If ξ ǫ 1 (a) ≥ 1 − ǫ · δ min , then we already have the desired action a; and we are done. Otherwise, we consider the distribution ξ ′ 1 defined as follows:
otherwise .
We now consider three cases to show ξ ′ 1 is also a witness distribution to satisfy at least one of the three conditions of LimAvgPre for ǫ.
1. Consider an action a 2 in C 1 . Since a 2 in C 1 and ǫ < δ min m , we must have that Succ(s, a, a 2 ) ∩ W = ∅, because otherwise given ξ ǫ 1 and a 2 the set W is reached with probability at least δ min m (as a is played with probability at least
This contradicts that a 2 satisfies Equation 1 for ξ ǫ 1 for the given ǫ < δ min m . Hence given a and a 2 , the probability to leave the set W is 0; and since all the other actions are only scaled in ξ ′ 1 as compared to ξ ǫ 1 we have
Hence, given ξ ′ 1 the action a 2 must also satisfy Equation 1 for ǫ.
2. Consider an action a 2 in C 2 . Since a 2 in C 2 (i.e., satisfies Equation 2) we must have Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 ) ⊆ X (stay in X with probability 1) and Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 ) ∩ Y = ∅ (next state in Y with positive probability). Since ξ ′ 1 assigns positive probability to precisely the same set of actions as ξ ǫ 1 , i.e., Supp(ξ ′ 1 ) = Supp(ξ ǫ 1 ), we have that Succ(s, ξ ′ 1 , a 2 ) = Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 ) ⊆ X (stay in X with probability 1) and Succ(s, The desired result follows.
The action with large probability. In Lemma 1 we showed that some action is played with large probability. In the lemma the action was chosen depending on ǫ, but since there are only finitely many actions and if an action satisfies for some 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , then it also satisfies for all ǫ ′ such that ǫ ≤ ǫ ′ < 1 2 , and thus it follows that there is an action that is played with large probability. We will call a parametrized distribution ξ ǫ 1 , for 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , an a-large distribution if the distribution plays action a with probability at least 1 − ǫ · δ min . Thus the existence of witness a-large distributions, if such distributions exist, follows from Lemma 1. The main crux of the algorithm would be to find an action a and a parametrized distribution that is a-large as a witness distribution for LimAvgPre. Our algorithm will use the LPre operator iteratively. The key information we need is encoded as a matrix as follows. The matrix for action sets. Given a state s, and the sets U ⊆ Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ⊆ W , we define an
corresponds to the type of successor encountered if player 1 plays action a 1 and player 2 plays action a 2 . Let
The matrix uses that U ⊆ Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ⊆ W , to ensure that the matrix is well-defined. Notice that M encodes all the information needed by LPre (the entries equal to W, Y, X, Z 1 , Z 0 all ensures both W and U are not reached, U ensures that U is reached with probability at least δ min and W is not reached. The entries W ensures that W is reached with probability between δ min and 1). Hence, we could alternatively give M as input to LPre. Intuitive description of the algorithm. We first present an intuitive description of our algorithm and then present it formally. The basic idea of the algorithm is to use LPre iteratively and the existence of a-large witness distributions. Given a candidate action a, we reject a or accept a using the following procedure. First, given the action a, if there is an action a 2 such that W is left with positive probability given a and a 2 (i.e., M a,a 2 = W ), then we reject a. Second, we check if playing a with probability 1 satisfies all actions (by either of the three conditions), and if so we accept. If neither of the first two conditions hold, then we use an iterative procedure. Let C be the set of actions which are guaranteed to be satisfied (by Equation 1) by playing an a-large distribution (C consists of each action a 2 such that M a,a 2 = U ). We run LPre, and start with (Γ 1 (s) \ {a}) as available actions for player 1 (we are only interested in a-large distributions and we do not consider a for LPre) and (Γ 2 (s) \ C) as available actions for player 2. If LPre rejects, we also reject: this is because no matter which action a 1 = a is played with the largest probability (and we could not play a alone) there is an action a 2 , such that M a 1 ,a 2 = W and M a,a 2 = U , which ensures that all three equations are violated. If LPre accepts, then we obtain a witness distribution ξ 1 and a set A 3 of actions of player 2 such that ξ 1 satisfies Equation 1 for all actions in A 3 . We then create ξ ′ 1 , which is ξ 1 scaled so that it plays an a-large distribution (note that ξ 1 plays a with probability 0). Afterwards we check if all actions for player 2 are satisfied by ξ ′ 1 . If so, we accept. Otherwise, we check that whether for each action a 2 outside (A 3 ∪ C) we can satisfy either Equation 2 or Equation 3: for a 2 to be satisfied using Equation 3, we must have that M a,a 2 = Z 1 ; and for a 2 to be satisfied using Equation 2, the distribution ξ ′ 1 must play some action a 1 with positive probability such that M a 1 ,a 2 = Y . If for some a 2 outside (A 3 ∪ C), neither M a,a 2 = Z 1 , nor M a 1 ,a 2 = Y , for some a 1 played with positive probability, we reject. Otherwise, if we did not reject, we remove each action a 1 for player 1 from available actions, for which there exists an a 2 ∈ (A 3 ∪ C), such that M a 1 ,a 2 = W . Note that if M a 1 ,a 2 = W , then we cannot satisfy a 2 using either Equation 2 or Equation 3, if we play a 1 with positive probability. If the set of available actions does not contain a, then we cannot play a with positive probability in an a-large distribution, which clearly means that no a-large distribution exists and thus we reject. If this new, smaller set of actions for player 1 contains a, we iterate on with the new set as the set of available actions for player 1, and the available set for player 2 always remains as (Γ 2 (s) \ C). Since, in every iteration, we get a smaller set of actions for player 1, we terminate at some point.
The algorithm ALGOPRED. We now describe the steps of the algorithm which we refer as ALGOPRED (algorithm for predecessor computation). For a state s, we consider every action a ∈ Γ 1 (s) as a candidate for the existence of an a-large witness distribution. For each action a we execute the following steps:
(Accept 1).
Accept a if for all a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) we have M a,a 2 ∈ {U, Y, Z 1 }, and then return the distribution that plays a with probability 1, and return "Accept" for state s.
3. Let C be the set of actions a 2 in Γ 2 (s) such that M a,a 2 = U . Initialize B 0 1 and A 0 1 as (Γ 1 (s) \ {a}). The remainder of the algorithm will be done in iterations. 1 and the ranking of the actions in the support). We will now define some sets of actions.
(Iteration). In iteration
5. We reject in the following cases:
1 , then reject this choice of a.
(Accept 2).
Otherwise if A i 1 ⊆ B i 1 , then return accept a, and return the parametrized distribution ξ ǫ 1 , for 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , that plays a with probability 1 − ǫ · δ min and with probability ǫ · δ min follows ξ ǫ,i 1 , and also "Accept" state s.
If the action is neither accepted nor rejected, then go to iteration
If all choices of action a ∈ Γ 1 (s) get rejected, then "Reject" state s.
The parametrized distribution for Accept 2 is returned as the special action a (to be played with probability 1 − ǫ · δ min , for 0 < ǫ < 1 2 ), the support set of ξ ǫ,i 1 and the ranking function of the support as given by the LPre operator (which gives the parametrized distribution for ξ ǫ,i 1 which is multiplied by ǫ · δ min to get the parametrized a-large witness distribution ξ ǫ 1 and a is played with the remaining probability). Illustrations with examples. We illustrate our algorithm on four M -matrices shown in Figure 5 . First observe that the only feasible candidate for an a-large distribution is the first row, because each other row contains an W entry, and thus will be rejected at the start. The first matrix shown in Figure 5a will be accepted by the algorithm and the other three will be rejected by the algorithm.
1. Consider first the matrix in Figure 5a . Then the algorithm is run with the first row as a, it will call LPre with the all rows but the first row for player 1 and all columns but the first column for player 2 (since given the first row, the first column satisfies Equation 1). The LPre algorithm will then return the distribution d of playing the second row with probability 1 − ǫ 2 and the third row with probability ǫ 2 . It also returns the set A 3 containing the second and third column (they satisfy Equation 1). We then get accept in that iteration, because column 4 and column 5 can be satisfied by Equation 2 and column 6 can be satisfied by Equation 3.
2. Consider now the second matrix, the one in Figure 5b . It will get rejected at start, because in this case each row contains an W entry.
3. The third matrix, the one in Figure 5c , will get rejected in the second iteration. In the first iteration, LPre will return the same distribution d as for the first matrix along with the same A 3 . This time, we cannot accept directly, because d no longer satisfies any of the three equations, for column 5. At that point, the algorithm considers that each column a 2 ∈ {4, 5, 6} such that M a 1 ,a 2 = Y for some a 1 ∈ {1, 2, 3} or M a,a 2 = Z 1 (where a = 1). Thus, the algorithm removes row 2, from the set of possible rows, because column 5 is such that M 2,5 = W , and 5 ∈ A 3 and iterate. Then the algorithm calls LPre and gets back reject, because each of the rows left contains at least one instance of W . Hence the algorithm rejects.
4. For the last matrix, the one in Figure 5d , the algorithm calls LPre and gets d and A 3 , but this time the algorithm rejects at that point, because row 6 (which is not in A 3 ) does not contain an action a 1 played with positive probability such that Proof. We will next show that if ALGOPRED returns a parametrized distribution ξ ǫ 1 , then for all 0 < ǫ < and for all actions a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), at least one of the three conditions of LimAvgPre is satisfied. This will show
This illustrates a M -matrix, which has an a-large distribution, where a corresponds to the first row.
This illustrates a M -matrix, which has no alarge distribution. The cicled entry is the only entry changed as compared to Figure 5a .
This illustrates a M -matrix, which has no alarge distribution. The cicled entry is the only entry changed as compared to Figure 5a . that s ∈ LimAvgPre(W, U, X, Y, Z). The algorithm accepts state s and returns a distribution at two places, namely, (Accept 1) and (Accept 2). For the case of Accept 1: the algorithms returns a distribution that plays some action a with probability 1; and for the case of Accept 2 it returns a distribution that plays some subset of actions (at least 2) with positive probability. We analyze both the cases below.
1. Case Accept 1. In the first case for all actions a 2 we have that M a,a 2 ∈ {U, Y, Z 1 }. We analyze the three sub-cases.
, the next state is in U with positive probability) and Succ(s, a, a 2 ) ∩ W = ∅ (i.e., the next state is in W with probability 0) and hence Equation 1 is satisfied.
The first condition ensures that the next state is in Y with positive probability and the second condition ensures the next state is in X with probability 1, and thus Equation 2 is satisfied.
, and hence Succ(s, a, a 2 ) ⊆ Z (i.e., next state in Z with probability 1); and (iii) r(s, a, a 2 ) = 1 (i.e., expected reward is 1). It follows that Equation 3 is satisfied.
Case Accept 2.
In the second case, we consider the case when the algorithm returns a parameterized distribution ξ ǫ 1 , for 0 < ǫ < 1 2 , in iteration i. Let the action played with probability 1 − ǫ · δ min be a. Such an action clearly exists, by construction. For any a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) such that M a,a 2 = U , then the next state is in U with probability at least (1 − ǫ · δ min ) · δ min and the next state is in W with probability at most ǫ · δ min and the ratio is at least 2 · ǫ; thus the distribution ξ ǫ 1 and a 2 satisfy Equation 1 for 2 · ǫ. As 0 < ǫ < 1 2 is arbitrary the result follows for all a 2 such that M a,a 2 = U . We consider the set C of remaining actions in Γ 2 (s), i.e., for all a 2 ∈ C we have M a,a 2 = U .
Satisfying Equation 1 in A i
2 . We have that M a,a 2 = W , for all a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), because otherwise the guess of action a would have been rejected, in (Reject 1). We also have that LPre(s, W, U, B ′ , C), for B ′ ⊆ (Γ 1 (s) \ {a}) must return an distribution ξ ′ 1 over B ′ and a set A ′ ⊆ C, such that for all a 2 ∈ A ′ , the action a 2 and the distribution ξ 
Satisfying Equation 2 or Equation 3 in (C \ A i
2 ). By definition of B i 1 and A i 1 (Step 4 (a) and Step 4 (b) of the algorithm), and that A i 1 ⊆ B i 1 (from Accept 2 of the algorithm), it follows that the distribution
2 ) and all a 1 such that ξ ǫ 1 (a 1 ) > 0, we have from Accept property b of LPre that M a 1 ,a 2 = W and M a 1 ,a 2 = U . Notice that therefore for all a 1 ∈ Supp(ξ ǫ 1 ) and
2 ) = B i 2 and we would have rejected this choice of a (by Reject 4 of the algorithm). Notice that M a,a 2 = Z 1 implies that Succ(s, a, a 2 )(Z) = 1 and that r(s, a, a 2 ) = 1, thus, since the distribution the algorithm returned was a-large, we get that we reach Z in one step with probability at least 1 − ǫ · δ min and get reward 1 with probability at least 1 − ǫ · δ min , hence Equation 3 is satisfied. If the second case holds (i.e.,
, Y is reached with positive probability in one step), thus implying that Equation 2 is satisfied.
Therefore the distribution ξ ǫ 1 is a witness distribution to satisfy the required conditions for 0 < ǫ < 1 2
for LimAvgPre. It follows that s ∈ LimAvgPre(W, U, X, Y, Z).
Patience.
The distribution returned by LPre over |Γ 1 (s)| − 1 actions has patience at most
. Hence it is clear from the algorithm that the distribution returned by the algorithm has patience at most
.
Our next goal is to present a lemma that complements the previous lemma. In other words, we would show that if ALGOPRED rejects an action a, then there would be no a-large distributions as witnesses for LimAvgPre. The algorithm rejects an action a at four places, and we will show that all the rejections are sound (i.e., if a is rejected, then there is no a-large witness distribution). We first show that the first rejection is sound. Soundness of Reject 1. We consider the case of Reject 1. In this case, there exists an action a 2 such that M a,a 2 = W . Given an a-large distribution ξ ǫ 1 , the one step probability to reach W (i.e., δ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 )(W )) is at least x = (1 − ǫ · δ min ) · δ min > ǫ, since ǫ < 1 2 and δ min ≤ 1, and even if U is reached with the remaining probability (i.e., even if δ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 )(U ) = 1 − x), it follows that Equation 1 is violated, for all 0 < ǫ < 1 2 .
The remaining two expressions cannot be satisfied because X ⊆ W and since we leave W with positive probability we as well leave X with positive probability. It follows that the rejection of action a is sound for Reject 1.
Rejects in iteration.
The other places the algorithm can reject action a, i.e., (Reject 2), (Reject 3), (Reject 4), and (Reject 5), are part of the iterative procedure. To prove soundness of these rejects we will define a loop invariant and prove the loop invariant inductively. We will also show that with the loop invariant we can establish soundness of the rejects in the iterative procedure as well as the termination of the algorithm.
The loop invariant. The loop invariant is as follows:
• Any a-large witness distribution ξ ǫ 1 for LimAvgPre only plays actions in
We will also establish the monotonicity (strictly decreasing till a fixpoint is reached) property that
1 ) ∪ {a}, for all i > 0; and equality implies termination in iteration i. Inductive proof of loop invariant. We present the basic inductive argument for the loop invariant:
• The base case, i = 0. The base case, for i = 0 is trivial, since
• The induction case, i > 0. By inductive hypothesis, any a-large witness distribution ξ ǫ 1 only plays actions in
1 ) ∪ {a} with positive probabilities, and we need to establish for i. We will show that any a-large witness distribution can only play actions in A i 1 ∪ {a} = A i 1 , (see the following description of A i 1 which uses the inductive hypothesis). We refer to this as required property 1 for loop invariant. Similarly, we establish the same for B i 1 (see the following description of B i 1 which uses the inductive hypothesis). We refer to this as required property 2 for loop invariant. Hence any witness a-large distribution can only play actions in
The above proof requires to establish the key properties of A i 1 and B i 1 . Before establishing them we first show the monotonicity property.
Monotoncity property. We will show that we have
1 ) ∪ {a}, for all i > 0, and equality implies termination of the inner loop in iteration i. Notice that this implies that for any choice of a the inner loop rejects a or finds a distribution after at most |Γ 1 (s)| iterations. We have that A i 1 = Supp(ξ ǫ 1 ) ∪ {a} (by Step 4 (a) of ALGOPRED), where ξ ǫ 1 is a witness distribution returned by
This establish monotonicity and now we show the termination. Assume that
But in the first case we reject (in (Reject 5)) and in the second case we accept (in (Accept 2)). This establishes the termination property.
The properties of the sets for loop invariant. We now present the associated properties of the sets A i 1 , A i 2 , B i 1 , and B i 2 to complete the inductive proof of the loop invariant.
1. The property of the set A i 2 . We first argue that A i 2 has certain properties which will imply the key properties for A i 2 .
(a) Since LPre(s, W, U, ((A
we have that ξ ǫ 1 and a 2 satisfies Equation 1 (by Accept property a of LPre).
(c) Notice also that for any action a 2 ∈ C, if a distribution over A , we must have that ξ ′ 1 ensures that X is reached with probability 0 (i.e., Succ(s, ξ ′ 1 , a 2 ) ⊆ X). Hence, since X ⊆ W we also must have that W is reached with probability 0.
By Accept property d of LPre we have that, since A i 2 is returned by LPre, no a-large witness distribution ξ ′ 1 can satisfy any action a 2 in (C \ A i 2 ) using Equation 1, while satisfying all actions in C using Equation 1, or Equation 2, or Equation 3. Also, for all a 2 in (C \ A i
2 ) and all a 1 ∈ Supp(ξ ǫ 1 ) we have that M a 1 ,a 2 = U (by Accept property b of LPre). Furthermore, by definition of C for all a 2 ∈ C we have that M a,a 2 = U . Therefore we have established the following key properties for A i 2 :
• Any a-large witness distribution ξ ′ 1 must satisfy all actions a 2 in (C \A i 2 ) using either Equation 2 or Equation 3.
2. The property of the set A i 1 . By accept property c of LPre and since we did not reject in Reject 1, the set A i 1 is the largest set, such that for all a 1 ∈ A i 1 there exists no a 2 in (C \A i 2 ) with M a 1 ,a 2 = W . But this means that any distribution that satisfies for all actions in (C \ A i 2 ) either Equation 2 or Equation 3, must play only actions in A i 1 . But from our description of A i 2 we obtain that all a-large witness distributions must ensure that all actions in (C \A i 2 ) are satisfied using either Equation 2 or Equation 3. Therefore we have established the following key property for A i 1 : All a-large witness distributions must play only actions in A i 1 with positive probability. This proves the required property 1 of the loop invariant.
The property of the set B i
2 . From the first key property of A i 2 we have that any a-large witness distribution must ensure that all actions in (C \ A i 2 ) satisfy either Equation 2 or Equation 3. From the second key property of A i 2 , for all a 1 ∈ A i 1 and all a 2 ∈ (C \ A i 2 ), we have that M a 1 ,a 2 = U . The key property of A i 1 implies that any a-large witness distribution must play only actions in A i 1 . Hence, for an a-large witness distribution ξ ′ 1 , for all a 2 in (C \A i 2 ) we must have that either (i) M a,a 2 = Z 1 (to satisfy Equation 3); or (ii) there is an action a 1 in A i 1 such that M a 1 ,a 2 = Y (to satisfy Equation 2 -it would also be satisfied if M a 1 ,a 2 = U but we know that M a 1 ,a 2 = U by Accept property b of LPre). But that is precisely the definition of B i 2 (
Step 4 (c) of ALGOPRED). Therefore, we have the following key property for B i 2 : Actions a 2 in (C \ (A i 2 ∪ B i 2 )) cannot be satisfied by Equation 1 or Equation 2 or Equation 3 by any a-large witness distribution.
1 . We know from the first key property of A i 2 that all actions in (C \ A i 2 ) must satisfy Equation 2 or Equation 3. But to do so we must leave X with probability 0. But B i 1 is the largest set of actions such that for all actions a 1 in B i 1 and for all actions a 2 in (C \ A i 2 ), we have that M a 1 ,a 2 = W (Step 4 (b) of ALGOPRED). Hence we have that an a-large distribution that plays an action in (Γ 1 (s) \ B i 1 ) with positive probability violates both Equation 2 and Equation 3 for some a 2 in (C \ A i 2 ). Therefore, we have the following key property for B i 1 : All a-large witness distributions only plays actions in B i
1 . This also proves the required property 2 of the loop invariant.
This establishes the inductive proof of the loop invariant. Proof. In the algorithm there are five places where a choice of a might get rejected. We have already argued the soundness of Reject 1. We prove the soundness of the other rejects below. 3 . The latter two because W is entered with positive probability in one step and hence X is left with positive probability in one step. The first is because we reach W with probability at least x = δ min m and even if we reach U with probability 1 − x, we still do not satisfy Equation 1. Now consider some distribution ξ ′ 1 over (A
Lemma 3. For a given
Either it plays a with probability 1 or not. If it does, then it cannot be a witness distribution, since it otherwise would have been accepted in Accept 1. If it does not then the argument is similar to the previous argument (in the case of Equation 1, the argument also uses that M a,a 2 = U from the definition of C). Hence no witness distribution exists that only uses actions in (A i−1 1
Thus Reject 2 is a sound reject, by the loop invariant.
(Reject 3).
If a is not accepted by Accept 1, then a could not be played with probability 1. For Reject 3, the condition ((A i 1 ∩ B i 1 ) \ {a}) = ∅ is satisfied. Thus no a-large witness distribution can play anything but a by the loop invariant. Therefore no a-large witness distribution can exist in this case. Thus, Reject 3 is a sound reject.
(Reject 4).
Consider an a-large witness distribution ξ ǫ 1 . The key property of B i 2 implies that any action
) cannot be satisfied using either of the equations. But since
for any a-large witness distribution to exists. Therefore we can reject the choice of a if (C \ A i 2 ) = B i 2 . Hence Reject 4 is a sound reject.
(Reject 5).
From the key property of the set B i 1 , we have that if a ∈ B i 1 , then no a-large witness distribution can play a with positive probability, which implies that no a-large witness distribution can exist. Hence Reject 5 is also a sound reject.
Termination.
We have already established (in "monotonicity and termination for loop invariant") that
1 ) ∪ {a}, for all i > 0 and equality implies termination of the inner loop in iteration i. Notice that this implies that for any choice of a the inner loop rejects a or finds a distribution after at most |Γ 1 (s)| iterations. We will now show that A i 2 ⊆ A i−1 2 , for all i > 0 and equality implies termination in iteration i. Notice that this implies that for any choice of a the inner loop rejects a or finds a distribution after at most |Γ 2 (s)| iterations. We have that
1 could also be returned in iteration i − 1 and LPre maximizes the number of a 1 's for which ξ
and thus we would have rejected the choice of a in iteration i − 1, because of (Reject 5). The desired result follows. (s, a 1 , a 2 )|) . Alternatively, if M is given as input, the running time is
Proof [13] . Hence, if M is given as input we get a running time of
Combining Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we get the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The algorithm ALGOPRED, for a given state s and sets
U ⊆ Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ⊆ W , correctly computes if s ∈ LimAvgPre(W, U, X, Y, Z) and runs in time O(|Γ 1 (s)| 2 · |Γ 2 (s)| 2 + a 1 ∈Γ 1 (s),a 2 ∈Γ 2 (s) |Supp(s, a 1 , a 2 )|).
Iterative algorithm for value 1 set computation
In this section we will present the nested iterative algorithm for the value 1 set computation. The nested iterative algorithm is succinctly represented as the following nested fixpoint formula (µ-calculus formula) that uses the LimAvgPre one-step predecessor operator. Let W * = νW.µU.νX.µY.νZ.LimAvgPre(W, U, X, Y, Z) .
We will show that W * = val 1 (LimInfAvg, Σ F 1 ) (also see the appendix, Section 6, for an algorithmic description of computation of the µ-calculus formula). First in the next subsection we show that W * ⊆ val 1 (LimInfAvg, Σ S 1 ) ⊆ val 1 (LimInfAvg, Σ F 1 ); and in the following subsection will establish the other inclusion.
First inclusion:
Let Θ i denote the random variable for the reward at the i-th step of the game. We will show that for all states s in W * for all ǫ > 0, there exists a stationary (hence finite-memory) strategy σ ǫ 1 for player 1 such that for all positional strategies σ 2 for player 2 we have that
This will show that W * ⊆ val 1 (LimInfAvg, Σ S 1 ) ⊆ val 1 (LimInfAvg, Σ F 1 ). Notice that the statement is trivially satisfied if W * = ∅, and hence we will assume that this is not so. Thus the computation of W * is achieved as follows: U 0 is the empty set; and U i = νX.µY.νZ.LimAvgPre(W * , U i−1 , X, Y, Z), for i ≥ 1. Let ℓ be the least index such that U ℓ = W * . For any i ≥ 0, we also have that Y i,0 is the empty set and that Y i,j = νZ.LimAvgPre(W * , U i−1 , U i , Y i,j−1 , Z), for j ≥ 1. For a state s ∈ W * , let the rank of state s (denoted rk(s) = (i, j)) be the tuple of (i, j) such that i is the least index with s ∈ U i (i.e., s ∈ U i \ U i−1 ); and j is the least index with s ∈ Y i,j (i.e., s ∈ Y i,j \ Y i,j−1 ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, let rk(i) = j be the least index when the fix point converges for U i , i.e., the least j such that
. By definition of W * , for all states s ∈ W * , if rk(s) = (i, j), then we must have that for all ǫ > 0 there is a distribution ξ ǫ 1 over Γ 1 (s) such that for all actions a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) for player 2 we have that
where .
The strategies will be constructed inductively. First we will construct it for states in U 1 and (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ), and then we will present the inductive construction for (U i \ U i−1 ), for 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1.
• (Base case). We will first describe the construction of the strategy σ ǫ,1,0 1 (resp. σ ǫ,ℓ,0 1 ).
1. The stationary strategy σ • (Inductive case). We will next construct the strategy for the remaining states, in two steps, first for σ ǫ,i,0 1 and then for σ ǫ,i,j 1 , for 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1 and j ≥ 1. We will do so using induction backwards in i. That is the base case is i = ℓ and we then proceed downward. (by Lemma 2).
Also for j ≥ 1, the patience σ
, where the inequality is as follows:
since (2m) j ≥ m ≥ 1 and ǫ < 1. The desired result follows.
Lemma 7.
Let 0 < ǫ < , since no states are in Y 1,0 . Similarly for s in U 2 and the corresponding distribution σ ǫ,1 1 (s). The η for which the strategy σ ǫ,2 1 follows σ η,i 1 : Inductive statement. We will argue using induction that for each state S ∈ (W * \ U i−1 ), for i ≥ 3, we have that the strategy σ ǫ,2 1 follows the strategy σ
Base case. For each state s ∈ (S \ U 2 ), the strategy σ , by construction, which is the wanted expression. Induction case i + 1. For i ≥ 4, for each state s ∈ (S \ U i−1 ), the strategy σ ǫ,2 1 follows the strategy σ
, by induction. In each state s ∈ (S \ U i ), the strategy σ
, by construction. Thus, the strategy σ ǫ,2 1 follows σ
The first inequality comes from our preceding explanation. The second inequality uses the inductive hypothesis. The third uses that
4 . The last equality is the inductive hypothesis for i + 1 and follows from
Patience of σ ǫ,2 1 (s) for states in U i , for i ≥ 3. We see that for i ≥ 3 and for each s in U i we have that σ
(since Y i,0 is empty), by construction. Hence, we get that
, using a similar argument as the one used in the inductive case. Since rk(i) ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1, we see that each term in the sum
is at least twice as large as the following. Thus, we have that
The first inequality is because U 1 must contain at least 1 state. The second comes from m ≥ 1. Hence,
. Using an argument similar to the one used to prove Lemma 6, we get that the patience for ξ η ′ 1 is then at most
Patience of σ ǫ 1 . We now need to consider the strategy σ ǫ 1 . It follows σ β,1 1 in U 1 and σ β,2 1
elsewhere, for β = ǫ 2 , We see that
The inequality is because 4 2 = 16 > 8 (and the last expression more than squares the preceding). This completes the proof.
Basic overview of the proof. We first present the basic overview of the proof. Let σ 1 be a stationary strategy that follows distribution ξ ). We will prove that σ ǫ 1 ensures value at least 1 − ǫ for each states s in W * . We will split the proof into four parts, first we will show some properties for states in U 1 , then for states in U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 , and finally for states in U i \ U i−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1. In the fourth part, we will then combine the three properties to establish the desired result. The three properties are as follows
• (Property 1). For all states s in U 1 we will show that σ ǫ,1 1 ensures Safe(U 1 ) with probability 1 and mean-payoff at least 1 − ǫ (i.e., for all positional strategies σ 2 we have lim t→∞
• (Property 2). For all states s in (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) we will show that σ ǫ,ℓ 1 ensures that against all positional strategies σ 2 we have that 1. given the event Safe(U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ), the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ; 
Pr

• (Property 3). For all states s in (U
1 ensures that against all positional strategies σ 2 we have that 1. given the event j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ), the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ;
Pr
In Lemma 8, Lemma 9, and Lemma 12 we establish Properties 1, 2, and 3, respectively. We first present the basic intuition of the proof of Lemma 8. The basic intuition of Lemma 8. The key idea of the proof is as follows. Once we fix the strategies for both the players we have a Markov chain. Let C 2 and C 3 denote the set of states in U 1 that satisfy Equation 5 and Equation 6, respectively. Since U 0 is empty, no state in U 1 can satisfy Equation 4. For states s in C 2 of rank (1, j), the fact that Equation 5 is satisfied ensures that a state of rank (1, j ′ ), for j ′ < j, is visited from s with positive probability. Let pat(j) denote the patience of the strategy σ ǫ,1 1 for states of rank (1, rk(1) − j). We now consider the following case analysis. . This bound on the number of visits in expectation to C 2 (which we say has not been accounted for by visits to C 3 ) is κ(0) = (δ min ) −1 · pat(0). There is an illustration of this base case in Figure 6 .
2. Now we consider that we are at some intermediate part of the computation, i.e., in some state in (Y 1,rk(1)−j \ Y 1,rk(1)−(j+1) ), for j ≥ 1. Inductively we have an upper bound κ(j) on the number of times that states in C 2 were visited (in the worst case each such visit gives reward 0) in expectation that has not been accounted for by visits to states in C 3 till we reach the set (Y 1,rk(1)−j \Y 1,rk(1)−(j+1) ) from any state in Y 1,rk(1)−j+1 . The one-step probability distribution ξ η 1 is chosen such that η · κ(j) ≤ ǫ. In other words, η decreases rapidly as i increases, and the small η ensures that if the play stays in (U 1 \ Y 1,rk(1)−(j+1) ), then the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ, i.e., if we have a recurrent class L contained in (U 1 \ Y 1,rk(1)−(j+1) ) and (L ∩ Y 1,rk(1)−j ) is non-empty, then all states in (L ∩ Y 1,rk(1)−j ) belong to C 3 , and the mean-payoff of the recurrent class is at least 1 − ǫ. Moreover, we can also upper bound the number of visits to states in C 2 in expectation that has not been accounted for by visits to states in C 3 before reaching the set Y 1,rk(1)−(j+1) if we leave (U 1 \ Y 1,rk(1)−(j+1) ) by κ(j + 1) = (κ(j) + 1) · (δ min ) −1 · pat(j), and then proceed inductively. There is an illustration of this inductive case in Figure 7 . , respectively. Notice that since U 0 is the empty set we have that C 1 is also empty. Therefore we cannot leave U 1 if player 1 follows σ ǫ,1 1 (because both Equation 5 and Equation 6 require that we stay in U 1 ). This ensures that Safe(U 1 ) is satisfied with probability 1. We now focus on the mean-payoff.
Basic notations. Let us consider the Markov chain obtained given σ ǫ,1 1 and σ 2 . For a state s ∈ U 1 , let the rank of s be rk(s) = (1, j), and then we denote j by rk 2 (s) (the second component of the rank). Given a play P in the Markov chain, and a number t ∈ N, let r(P, t) be the expected number of times we get reward 0 in the first t steps of P . This implies that r(P, 0) = 0. For each state s ∈ U 1 , let P j s be (a prefix of) a play in the Markov chain, which ends if a state in Y 1,j is reached after the starting point s (i.e., the play does not end at s if s ∈ Y 1,j ), and if Y 1,j is not reached, then the walk does not end. We will also use the following notations: for 0 ≤ j ≤ rk(1) − 1, let us denote by κ(j + 1) =
; and let
, the patience of σ ǫ,1 1 for states in U 1 of rank (1, rk(1) − j) (by Lemma 6). Using recurrent class property. First, observe that since Y 1,0 is the empty set, the set Y 1,0 can never be reached, and hence P 0 s represents the entire play from the start state s, for s ∈ U 1 . By Markov property 5 in the Markov chain, the recurrent classes are reached in a finite number of steps with probability 1, and given a recurrent class L is reached, every state in L is reached with probability 1 in a finite number of steps. Given a recurrent class L in U 1 , and consider a state s * in L that has the maximum rank among states in L (i.e., rk 2 (s * ) = max s ′ ∈L rk 2 (s ′ )). Then all states visited after s * has rank at most the rank of s * . Hence every play P 0 s with probability 1, after finitely many steps reaches a state s * such that all states s ′ visited after s * satisfy that rk 2 (s ′ ) ≥ rk 2 (s * ). Since the mean-payoff is invariant under finite prefixes, we only need to obtain bounds for the mean-payoff of P rk(s * )−1 s * (and this play has infinite length by definition as no state with smaller rank is reached in the Markov chain after s * ).
Inductive proof statement. We will show, inductively, that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ rk(1), all t ≥ 1, and all states s ∈ U 1 , if rk 2 (s) = rk(1) − j, then
This will imply the desired result, since then the mean-payoff of P rk 2 (s * )−1 s * is at least 1 − ǫ: the play P rk 2 (s * )−1 s * has infinite length and therefore the expected number of reward 1's must be t − r(P
in the first t steps for all t, because all rewards are either 0 or 1, and hence the mean-payoff of P
Splitting the play. Consider a play P rk 2 (s)−1 s for s ∈ U 1 . We will split up the play P rk 2 (s)−1 s into a (possible infinite) sequence of rank preserving plays (P
) i≥0 , such that s 0 = s, and for i ≥ 0, the play P rk 2 (s i ) s i ends in state s i+1 (which is formally a random variable and must be such that rk 2 (s i ) = rk 2 (s i+1 ) by definition of P rk 2 (s i ) s i and since if a state of lower rank than rk 2 (s) is reached, then the play P rk 2 (s)−1 s ends). In other words, the next play begins where the previous play ends, and all the starting points of the play has the same rank. Similarly, we will split up plays P j s , for 0 ≤ j < rk 2 (s), into a finite sequence of rank decreasing plays (P rk 2 (s i )−1 s i ) i≥0 , such that s 0 = s, and for i ≥ 0, the play P rk 2 (s i )−1 s i ends in state s i+1 (which must be such that rk 2 (s i ) > rk 2 (s i+1 ) > j). Note that since the play sequence is decreasing, the sequence of plays is finite and the length of the sequence is at most rk 2 (s) − j. Pictorial illustrations of rank preserving (both when the sequence is finite and infinite) and rank decreasing plays are given in Figure 8 , Figure 9 , and Figure 10 , respectively. (Base case). We first consider the base case, where j = 0, i.e., we consider s such that rk 2 (s) = rk(1). Consider the rank preserving split up of the play P , t), for all s ′ such that rk(s ′ ) = rk(s). We will now split the proof into the following two cases: (1) s ′ ∈ C 2 ; and (2) s ′ ∈ C 3 ; (as already argued at the start of the proof of this lemma, the set C 1 is empty). before we reach Y 1,rk(1)−1 . In the worst case we get a reward of 0 in each such step.
2. In each step we are in state s ′ in (C 3 ∩ (Y 1,rk(1) \ Y 1,rk(1)−1 )) we get reward 1 with probability at least 1 − ǫ (by Equation 6 ).
For the play P
, the expected number of indices i such that s i ∈ C 2 is at most of rank preserving plays. Note that the last play could be infinite (which is not pictorially illustrated). Straight line segments indicate that all states are shown on them, while non-straight segements indicate that there might be states which are not shown. of rank decreasing plays. Note that the last play could be infinite (which is not pictorially illustrated). Straight line segments indicate that all states are shown on them, while non-straight segements indicate that there might be states which are not shown. expectation) indices i ′ are such that s i ′ ∈ C 3 , for which the expected reward is at least 1 − ǫ (by the second item above). Thus we have
as desired.
(Inductive case). We now consider the inductive case for j ≥ 1, i.e., we now consider s such that rk 2 (s) = rk(1) − j. Consider the rank preserving split of the play P
) i≥0 as explained before the base case. We will consider r(P rk 2 (s ′ ) s ′ , t), for all s ′ with rk(s ′ ) = rk(s). As in the base case, we will split the proof into the two cases: (1) s ′ ∈ C 2 ; and (2) s ′ ∈ C 3 ; (and recall C 1 is empty). Before we consider the case analysis, we first present the use of the inductive hypothesis. Use of inductive hypothesis. The inductive hypothesis will be used in the same way for both cases in the case analysis. Let t ∈ N be given. For all states s ′′ ∈ U 1 such that rk 2 (s ′′ ) > rk 2 (s) = rk(1) − j, we will use the inductive hypothesis to upper bound r(P rk(1)−j s ′′ , t). Consider the rank decreasing split of P
There are most j such plays in the sequence, one for each rank strictly higher than rk(1) − j. We only argue about the worst case, and in the worst case, s ′ i is such that rk 2 (s ′ i ) = rk(1) − i. Let t i be the random variable indicating the number of steps among the first t steps such that P
. We see that r(P
By the inductive hypothesis we have that
for each t ′ ≥ 1. Thus, we get that
The first inequality is the inductive hypothesis, and we now argue that
because each term of the sum is over 4 times as large as the preceding (because (2m) i+1 ≥ 1 + (2m) i , for m ≥ 2 and i ≥ 0 and the factor of 4) and thus, the last term is over 2 times larger than the sum of all the other terms (we just use that it is larger). We now consider the case analysis.
• (States in C 2 ). In this case we consider r(P
1 , has patience pat(j) for states s ′′ ∈ U 1 such that rk 2 (s ′′ ) = rk 2 (s) = rk(1) − j (from Lemma 6). In expectation the play P rk 2 (s)−1 s is therefore in a state s ′′ in C 2 such that rk(s ′′ ) = rk(s) at most pat(j) · (δ min ) −1 times before reaching a state with lower rank (i.e., before the play ends). If the play does not end, whenever we have been in C 2 , we reach some state s ′′ in U 1 (as safety to U 1 is guaranteed). Also, in the worst case we get a reward of 0 in the every step we are in a state of rank rk 2 (s) in C 2 . There are two sub-cases. Either rk 2 (s ′′ ) = rk 2 (s) or rk 2 (s ′′ ) > rk 2 (s) (because if the rank is lower the walk ends). In the first sub-case the play P rk 2 (s ′ ) s ′ has length 1. In the other case, we have already given an upper bound on r(P rk(1)−j s ′′ , t ′ ), for all t ′ ≥ 1, using the inductive hypothesis. We therefore have that
where we have just explained the first inequality. The second inequality is our use of the inductive hypothesis as previously explained. The last inequality uses that κ(j) =
(since 4 (2m) j ≥ 16 and hence
ǫ for i, m ≥ 1) and 1 − ǫ < 1.
• (States in C 3 ). In this case we consider r(P
, t), for s ′ ∈ C 3 , such that rk(s ′ ) = rk(s). By construction, the strategy σ ǫ,1
, the next state s 1 after the start state s ′ is in U 1 with probability 1; the reward is 1 with probability at least 1 − η, and as well s ′ ∈ Y 1,rk(1)−i with probability at least 1 − η (since Equation 6 is ensured). With the remaining probability of at most η, the play P
goes to a state s ′′ in U 1 . As before the worst case (for the proof) is that with the remaining probability of at most η the state s ′′ is such that rk 2 (s ′′
The first inequality is by the preceding explanation. The second inequality uses the inductive hypothesis as previously described. In the first equality, we use that by definition we have η · κ(j) = ǫ 2 . In the third inequality we use that η · ǫ ≤ ǫ since η ≤ 1 and t ≥ 1; and the final inequality uses that since η ≤ ǫ 4 we have η + ǫ 2 < ǫ and η · ǫ < ǫ, for ǫ < 1; for i, m ≥ 1 which ensures η ≤ We now combine the above case analysis to establish the inductive proof. We will now consider r(P rk 2 (s)−1 s , t) and our rank preserving split (P
. For all i ≥ 0, let t i be the random variable indicating the number of steps P
, t i ) (the random variable k indicates the highest index such that t k ≥ 1, implying that t i ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k). Hence, we have that
The first equality follows from our preceding explanation. The first inequality uses our bound on r(P
, t i ) from the respective items above, depending on whether s i ∈ C 2 or s i ∈ C 3 . The second inequality uses that there are at most pat(j) · (δ min ) −1 indices i such that s i ∈ C 2 , from the first item above, and that t = 1 against all positional counter-strategies of the opponent ensures that in the resulting Markov chain all recurrent classes that intersect with U 1 are contained in U 1 , all states in U 1 have successors only in U 1 ; (i.e., the recurrent classes in U 1 are reached with probability 1 from all states in U 1 ); and in every recurrent class in U 1 the mean-payoff value is at least 1 − ǫ. 
Proof. Given σ ǫ,ℓ 1 , let σ 2 be an arbitrary positional counter-strategy for player 2. We see that σ ǫ,ℓ 1 is stationary and follows the distribution ξ η over Γ 1 (s) for some 0 < η < ǫ in state s ∈ (W * \ U ℓ−1 ). Let C σ ǫ,ℓ 1 ,σ 2 i = C i , i.e., given σ ǫ,ℓ 1 and σ 2 , we have that C 1 , C 2 , C 3 are the set of states of (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) that satisfy Equation 4, Equation 5, Equation 6, respectively. Let R S be the set of states in (U ℓ \U ℓ−1 ), from which (C 1 ∩(U ℓ \U ℓ−1 )) is not reachable in the Markov chain (i.e., in the graph of the Markov chain given σ ǫ,ℓ 1 and σ 2 , the set R S is the set of states in (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) from which no state in (C 1 ∩ (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 )) is reachable). Equivalently, R S is the set from which (U ℓ−1 ∪ W * ) cannot be reached (the definitions are equivalent, because, from each
can be reached in one-step iff s ∈ C 1 ).
Consider now the segment of the play from state s in (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) till the play leaves (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ).
1. First we consider the case when s ∈ R S . This corresponds to the proof of correctness for states in U 1 (note that in the correctness proof of U 1 the set C 1 was empty; and if C 1 is not reached, then the proof is identical to Lemma 8, by construction of the strategy). Hence we have that Safe(U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) is ensured with probability 1 (because (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) can only be left from states in Lemma 8) . This establishes all the required conditions of the lemma.
2. By Markov property 2, we have that Reach(U ℓ−1 ∪ W * ∪ R S ) happens with probability 1 (since R S is the set from which
it follows that Reach(U ℓ−1 ∪W * ∪R S ) with probability 1 implies Reach(
is also ensured with probability 1, since (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) cannot be left once R S is reached. This also shows that every recurrent class contained in (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) must be contained in R S (and by the first item has mean-payoff value at least 1 − ǫ). This shows that given the event Safe(U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ), the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ. From every state in (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ), in the Markov chain, we have that δ(s)(U ℓ−1 ) · ǫ ≥ δ(s)(W * ) (from states which are not in C 1 , both probabilities are 0 and C 1 by Equation 4). Hence, Markov property 7 implies that event Reach(U ℓ−1 ∪R S ) happens with probability 1−ǫ (since R S is the set from which (U ℓ−1 ∪W * ) cannot be reached), i.e., we have Pr
The desired result follows.
Remark 10. Lemma 9 proves the desired result only for states in (U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ) and can be considered as the base case of Lemma 12 which proves a similar result for states in
and since mean-payoff objectives are independent of finite prefixes, it also follows from Lemma 9 that given the event coBuchi(U ℓ \ U ℓ−1 ), we have that the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ.
Before presenting the proof for Property 3 we first present a lemma that we will use to prove the property. shown in Figure 11 . The probability to eventually reach s 1 from s 2 and s 3 is
)·x·(1−η) and
Proof. Let y 2 and y 3 denote the probability to reach s 1 from s 2 and s 3 , respectively. Then we have .
Hence we have
Solving for y 2 , and then inserting into y 3 = (1 − η) · y 2 , we obtain the desired result. ensures that against all positional strategies σ 2 for all states s ∈ (U ℓ \ U ℓ−(i+1) ) we have that 1. given the event j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ), the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ;
Proof. Given σ ǫ,ℓ−i 1 , let σ 2 be an arbitrary positional counter-strategy for player 2. Let C and σ 2 , we have that C 1 , C 2 , C 3 are the set of states of (U ℓ \ U ℓ−(i+1) ) that satisfy Equation 4, Equation 5, Equation 6, respectively. This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 9. The proof will be by induction in i, where i = 0 is the base case. Hence, the base case is settled by Lemma 9. We see that σ ǫ,ℓ−i 1 is stationary and follows the distribution ξ η 1 over Γ 1 (s) for some η > 0 in state s ∈ (W * \ U ℓ−(i+1) ). We consider the Markov chain obtained by fixing the two strategies. In the worst case, states in W * are absorbing with reward 0; and since the target is to reach U ℓ−(i+1) we consider that the plays end if they leave T = (W * \ U ℓ−(i+1) ), i.e., we are interested in the segment of the play in (W * \ U ℓ−(i+1) ). The play can only end from a state in C 1 ∩ T because T = j≤i (U ℓ−j \U ℓ−(j+1) ) and if a state s in (U ℓ−j \U ℓ−(j+1) ) satisfies either Equation 5 (in C 2 ) or Equation 6 (in C 3 ), then the set (U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) is not left from s in one-step. Now consider a play P in the Markov chain. Let R S be the subset of T , from which C 1 ∩ T is not reachable in the Markov chain. There are two cases and we have that η < ǫ, for m ≥ 2 and rk(ℓ − i) ≥ 1. If i ′ = i, then, precisely like in the proof of Lemma 9, the set (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ) cannot be left in C 2 or C 3 and hence, using an argument like Lemma 8, we have that lim t→∞ 1 for states in (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ) and states in U 1 , respectively. Observe that this case is the same as the corresponding case in Lemma 9 and ensures all the required items of the lemma.
2. (P starts outside R S : Item (1) of the lemma statement). First observe that we can only ensure Safe(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ), for some j ≤ i, from states in R S , since from all other states C 1 is reachable and for every j, states in (C 1 ∩ (U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) )), can reach U ℓ−(j+1) in one-step with positive probability, by Equation 4. Hence, if j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) is ensured, then given the event j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) a recurrent class that is reached must be contained in R S . Hence given the event j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ), the set R S is reached in a finite number of steps with probability 1. Since mean-payoffs are independent of finite-prefixes, the finite prefix to reach R S does not change the mean-payoff. Moreover, since if we start in R S the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ, it follows that given the event j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) we have that the mean-payoff is at least 1 − ǫ. (Reach(U ℓ−i )) = 1 from state s in (U ℓ \U ℓ−i ) (clearly, from such states U ℓ−i is reachable in the Markov chain since they are reached with probability 1). We only need to argue about the worst case. Let R ′ S be the subset of
(P starts outside R S : Item (2) of the lemma statement). For
) cannot be reached in the Markov chain. Hence, for each state s in (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ), the state s must either be in R ′ S (in which case R ′ S is reachable) or the set (C 1 ∩ (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) )) must be reachable from s. From the set (C 1 ∩ (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) )), the set U ℓ−(i+1) is reached in one-step with positive probability. We therefore get that from any state in
is reachable, by transitivity of reachabillity. Hence, by Markov property 8 we have that Pr
is reachable, and the set (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ) can be left only from states in C 1 ∩ (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ). Hence reachability to R ′ S ensures coBuchi((U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) )). Thus we have that
The first equality uses that (S \ T ) = (U ℓ−(i+1) ∪ W * ). The first inclusion uses that Reach(R ′ S ) ensures coBuchi(U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ). Hence, from each state s ∈ T we have that SP(s, ℓ − i) = 1 as desired. Item (3) of the lemma statement. ). We will now show that the probability of the event ( j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) ∪ Reach(U ℓ−i )) is at least 1 − ǫ. We will do so by modeling the worst case using the Markov chain G in Figure 11 . We have one state representing each of the following sets
(P starts outside (R S ∩ T ):
We will refer to the states as s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and s 4 , respectively. We will now argue about the transition probabilities, and first consider the absorbing states.
The state s 1 . We are interested in the probability that (U ℓ−(i+1) ∪ R S ) is eventually reached. This probability does not depend on what happens after (U ℓ−(i+1) ∪ R S ) is reached. Hence, we consider s 1 as absorbing, like in G 
, with probability 1, by Markov property 3 (recall that we cannot reach states outside
is the subset of (U ℓ−i \ U ℓ−(i+1) ) from which (C 1 ∩ T ) cannot be reached). If we reach R S , an argument similar to the first item in the proof of this lemma shows that we satisfy the desired statement. Thus, in the worst case we always reach
, σ 2 )(U ℓ−(i+1) ) be the one-step transition probability to U ℓ−(i+1) . By Equation 4 , and the construction of the strategy, we have that
Clearly, in the worst case we have that
(recall that W * is absorbing). Also, the fact x s > δ(s, σ , is an upper bound on the patience of the distribution σ ǫ,ℓ−i 1 (s), by Lemma 6. Thus with probability x s we go to U ℓ−(i+1) , with probability ǫ 2 · x s we go to W * , and with the remaining probability of (1 − (1 + ǫ 2 ) · x s ) we go to a state in T , which in the worst case is a state in (U ℓ \ (U ℓ−i ∪ R S )). This is so, because, in the worst case, to reach (U ℓ−(i+1) ∪ R S ) from (U ℓ \ (U ℓ−i ∪ R S )) we must go through a state in (U ℓ−i \ (U ℓ−(i+1) ∪ R S )), and hence the probability to reach U ℓ−(i+1) is minimized when x s is as small as possible, for all s. That is, 
. By item (2) of the lemma statement, we enter W * with the remaining probability (which is absorbing). Hence, the worst case must be where Pr
As previously argued, in the first item and second item of this lemma, the event j≤i−1 coBuchi(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) ensures reachability to R S (i.e., ensures Reach(R S )). In the worst case for the proof the probability to reach (R S ∪U ℓ−i−1 ) is minimized, and thus in the worst case we have Pr . The probability to eventually reach s 1 from s 2 or s 3 . We have that x ≤ 1 2 (since pat(ℓ − i) ≤ 1 2 , for m ≥ 2 and rk(ℓ − i) ≥ 1). Also, 0 < η, ǫ < 1 (in the case of η, because m ≥ 2 and rk(ℓ − i) ≥ 1). Hence we can apply Lemma 11 and get that the probability to eventually reach s 1 from s 2 and s 3 is
)·x·(1−η) , respectively. Cleary, the probability from s 3 is the smallest. We will show that it is greater than 1 − ǫ. We have that
We will argue about the first inequality last. The second inequality follows from
To show the first inequality we will argue that
The inequalities comes from η < , by definition. The third equality uses that η = ǫ·δ min 4 (2m) rk(ℓ−i)
, by definition.
Ensuring item (3) of the lemma statement. We see that the probability to reach (U ℓ−(i+1) ∪ R S ) from T is more than 1 − ǫ (by recalling the definition of s 1 , s 2 and s 3 ) and thus item (3) of the lemma statement is ensured, because from states in R S the event j≤i Safe(U ℓ−j \ U ℓ−(j+1) ) is ensured (as argued in the beginning of the lemma) and hence reaching R S ensures j≤i coBuchi(U ℓ−j \U ℓ−(j+1) ).
The desired result follows. 1 , for β = ǫ 2 , in the remaining states. Therefore σ ǫ 1 ensures that the mean-payoff of any play that starts in U 1 is at least 1 − β, by Lemma 8. Since σ ǫ 1 is stationary, once σ ǫ 1 is fixed we obtain an MDP for player 2, and in MDPs positional strategies always suffice to minimize mean-payoff objectives [18] . Hence, Lemma 12 shows that if the play starts in s ∈ (U ℓ \ U 1 ), then with probability 1 − β the play either stays in (U j \ U j−1 ) for some j ≥ 2 and ensures mean-payoff of at least 1 − β or reaches U 1 , from which we will get mean-payoff 1 − β. By simple multiplication (using that rewards are at least 0) we therefore see that we get mean-payoff at least
Lemma 13 implies the following inclusion.
Lemma 14.
We have W * ⊆ val 1 (LimInfAvg(r), Σ S 1 ) ⊆ val 1 (LimSupAvg(r), Σ S 1 ).
Second inclusion:
We will now show that for all states s ∈ W * that there exists a constant c > 0 such that no finite-memory strategy σ 1 for player 1 can ensure value more than 1 − • Let X i,0 be S and X i,j be νX.µY.νZ.LimAvgPre(W i−1 , W i , X i,j−1 , Y, Z).
• Also let Z i,j,0 be S and Z i,j,k be LimAvgPre(
Let ℓ ≥ 0 be the smallest number such that W ℓ = W ℓ+1 = W * . Let rk(i), be the smallest number j such that X i,j = X i,j+1 . Also, let rk(i, j), be the smallest number k such that Z i,j,k = Z i,j,k+1 . We have that for any state s in W * , there must be some smallest number i such that s is not in W i (since W 0 is S, we have that i > 0). Also, there must be some smallest j such that s is not in X i,j and similar for k and Z i,j,k . We define the rank of a state s ∈ W * as rk(s) = (i, j, k), where i (resp. j, and k) is the smallest number such that s not in W i (resp. X i,j and Z i,j,k ). By definition of W * , there exists a constant c > 0, such that for a state s, with rk(s) = (i, j, k), for all distributions ξ 1 over Γ 1 (s) there must exist an counter-action a s,ξ 1 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) for player 2 such that all the following conditions hold (i.e., the negation of the conditions of LimAvgPre hold):
If the above conditions hold, then one of the following three conditions hold as well. We first explain the following cases: (i) if δ(s, ξ 1 , a 2 )(X i,j−1 ) < 1, then both the second and third condition is satisfied (this corresponds to Case (2) below); (b) otherwise we must have δ(s, ξ 1 , a s,ξ 1 2 )(X i,j ) = 0 to satisfy the second condition above and (ExpRew(s, ξ 1 , a
2 )(Z 1,j,i−1 ) < 1−c) to satisfy the third condition above (this corresponds to Case (1) below). Thus we have that either
• Case (2) . There is a a
• Case (3) . There is a a
We will use the above three cases explicitly in our proof.
The counter-strategy σ 2 given σ 1 . Fix an arbitrary finite-memory strategy σ 1 for player 1. Let the finite set of memories used by σ 1 be Mem. A counter-strategy σ 2 given σ 1 is defined as follows: given the current state s of the game, and current memory state m ∈ Mem, let ξ 1 be the distribution played by σ 1 . The strategy σ 2 for player 2 plays an action a s,ξ 1 2 (if there are more than one option for a s,ξ 1 2 , pick one arbitrarily) with probability one. If σ 1 uses memory set Mem, then σ 2 also uses the memory set Mem and has the same memory update function.
Upper bound on value ensured by σ 1 . We will show that given σ 1 and the counter-strategy σ 2 the meanpayoff value is at most 1 − c n n for all starting states in W * . Also note that the upper bound on the value is independent of the size of the memory, and this shows that in the complement of W * the values achievable by finite-memory strategies is strictly bounded below 1.
The game G × Mem. Consider the game G and a product with any deterministic automaton A with state space Q. Every state in W * × Q in the synchronous product game belongs to the set W * computed in the product game and the ranks also coincide (by the properties of µ-calculus formulae). Consider the synchronous product game G × Mem of G and the memories of σ 1 and σ 2 , where states corresponds to pairs in (S, Mem) and where δ((t, m), a, b)((t ′ , m ′ )) = δ(s, a, b)(t) where σ u 1 (t, a, b, m) = m ′ and hence also σ u 2 (t, a, b, m) = m ′ . In this game the strategy corresponding to σ 1 can be interpreted as a stationary strategy σ ′ 1 . Also the strategy corresponding to σ 2 can be interpreted as a positional strategy σ ′ 2 in G× Mem. Hence given the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 we can obtain a Markov chain on G × Mem, considering the stationary strategies σ ′that this ensures that P s always stays in W 1 . Let R S be the set of states from which no state in C 2 can be reached. There are now two cases, either P s Mem reaches a state in R S or it does not.
• The play P s Mem reaches a state in R S . Let j = rk(1). Then the mean-payoff is at most 1 − c j j after reaching R S , by a argument similar to the one for states in X 1,1 . Therefore, in this case, the mean-payoff of P s is at most 1 − c j j , since the mean-payoff is independent of the finite-prefix.
• The play P s Mem does not reach a state in R S . In this case, we must visit states in C 2 infinitely often with probability 1, by Markov property 1. Whenever we are in a state s ′ in C 2 ∩ ((X 1,j × Mem) \ (X 1,j−1 × Mem)), we have probability at least p · δ min to reach (X 1,j−1 × Mem) in one-step where 1 p is the maximum patience of any distribution played by σ 1 . Whenever we are in a state s ′ in C 1 ∩ ((X 1,j × Mem) \ (X 1,j−1 × Mem)), we have probability 0 to leave ((X 1,j × Mem) \ (X 1,j−1 × Mem)) in one-step. Therefore we must reach (X 1,1 × Mem) in a finite number of steps with probability 1 and from (X 1,1 × Mem) we get a mean-payoff of at most 1 − c j j , where j = rk(1), as we have already established in the first item 4 .
Therefore, in both cases we get a mean-payoff of at most 1 − c j j with probability 1, where j = rk(1), i.e., all recurrent classes have mean-payoff of at most 1 − c j j .
3. Plays starting in s ∈ (W * \ W 1 ). Consider now state s in (W * \ W 1 ). Consider the play P s in G and the corresponding play P s Mem in G × Mem. For i ≥ 1, let L i = W i ∪ W i−1 and note that L i = W i \ W i−1 . Let R i be the set of states in L i from which no state in C 3 ∩ L i is reachable; (note that R i ⊆ L i ∩ (C 1 ∪ C 2 )). Note that from L i , the set L i can be left only from states in C 3 ∩ L i . We now consider two sub-cases.
• We first consider the case where we reach R i . Let j = rk(i). In this case, the mean-payoff is at most 1 − c j j by an argument similar to the argument for s in W 1 \ X 1,1 . The argument for s in W 1 \ X 1,1 only uses that states in C 1 ∪ C 2 are visited. Once R i is reached we are guaranteed that only states in R i are visited, and hence the recurrent classes in R i has mean-payoff of at most 1 − c n n .
• If R i is not reached, then since from every state C 3 ∩ L i we have positive transition probability to L i , it follows that L i is reached with probability 1, by Markov property 4. But if we reach either W i or W i−1 , we have a probability of at least c that it will be W i−1 (since it can only be done whenever P s Mem is in C 3 ∩ L i , which ensures so).
Each time we repeat the second case, all states in L i , will never be visited again, in the worst case. Since each set L i must contain atleast one state, we see that, if we repeat the second case k times and thereafter enter R i ′ (and are thus in the first case), then n − k ≥ rk(i ′ ). We have a probability of c k to follow such a play and we then get value at most 1 − c n−k n−k . Even if we got mean-payoff 1 with the remaining probability of 1 − c k , we still have a expected mean-payoff of at most 1 − c n n−k . Thus, we see that in the worst case k = 0 with probability 1, in which case we get mean-payoff at most 1 − c n n .
Lemma 15 implies the following inclusion.
Lemma 16.
We have val 1 (LimSupAvg(r), Σ F 1 ) ⊆ W * .
Improved Rank-Based Algorithm
In this section we present an improved rank-based algorithm, which is based on the same principle as the small-progress measure algorithm [24] (for parity games). While the naive computation of the µ-calculus formula for the value 1 set requires O(n 4 ) iterations, the improved algorithm will require O(n 2 ) iterations.
Basic idea. The basic idea of the algorithm is to consider the ranking function rk from Section 3.2.1 and use that to obtain an algorithm. Notice that rk(s) for s ∈ W * is always a pair (i, j) such that 2 ≤ i + j ≤ n + 1 and where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. We see that for any number k there are k − 1 pairs (i, j) such that i + j = k and such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k − 1. Hence, there are n k=1 k = n(n+1) 2 such pairs (i, j) such that 2 ≤ i + j ≤ n + 1 and where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Furthermore we also have a special rank ⊤ for not being in W * . The ranks are lexicographically ordered as follows
(1, 1) < (1, 2) < · · · < (1, n) < (2, 1) < · · · < (n, 1) < ⊤ .
We will thus say that (i, j) < ⊤ for all i, j and (i, j) < (i ′ , j ′ ) if i < i ′ or i = i ′ and j < j ′ ; (and for (i, j) ≤ (i ′ , j ′ ) we change j ≤ j ′ ). To distinguish with the ranking function in Section 3.2.1, we denote the ranking function of the improved algorithm as rk ′ (s).
Definition of matrix.
Consider a given assignment of ranks to states. Let s be some state of rank rk ′ (s) = ⊤ and therefore of rank (i, j) for some i and j; and also consider a state s ′ of rank (i ′ , j ′ ). We define some sets, U s , Y s , Z s , X s , W s as follows:
1. The state s ′ is in U s , if i > i ′ .
2. The state s ′ is in Y s , if i > i ′ or i ′ = i and j > j ′ .
3. The state s ′ is in Z s , if i > i ′ or i ′ = i and j ≥ j ′ .
4. The state s ′ is in X s , if i ≥ i ′ .
5. The state s ′ is in W s independent of s.
Also if a state s ′′ has rank ⊤, then it is in the set W s . This set also does not depend on s. Let M s a 1 ,a 2 ∈ {W s , U s , W s , Y s , X s , Z 1 s , Z 0 s }, for a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), be the matrix similar to the matrix M from Section 3.1, except that instead of set W use W s and similar for U , Y , Z, X and W .
The RANKALGO algorithm. We will refer to our algorithm as RANKALGO and the description is as follows:
Main result and Concluding Remarks
We now summarize the main result, and conclude with an open question. (s, a 1 , a 2 )|) ). Notice that the patience closely matches the patience obtained for the concurrent reachability game Purgatory, by Hansen, Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [20, Theorem 10] (the bound for m = 2 is also in [22] ). Concurrent reachability games is a subclass of concurrent mean-payoff games and always have ǫ-optimal stationary strategies, for all ǫ > 0, and all states in Purgatory have value 1. Thus the example provides a closely matching lower bound for patience.
Robustness.
Our results show that the value 1 set computation can be achieved by an iterative algorithm with the LimAvgPre operator. Our algorithm for the LimAvgPre operator computation is based on the matrix construction M , and observe that the entries in the matrix depends only on the support set, but not the precise probabilities. It follows that given two concurrent games where the support sets of the transition functions match, but the precise transition probabilities may differ, the value 1 set remains unchanged.
Concluding remarks.
In this work we considered concurrent mean-payoff games and presented a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the value 1 set for finite-memory strategies for player 1. An interesting open question is whether the value 1 set with infinite-memory strategies can also be computed in polynomial time.
Technical appendix -Computation of LPre
We now present the details of the computation of LPre(s, W, U, A 1 , A 2 ). We will establish the Reject property and Accept properties a-d of LPre. We first recall the properties:
• (Accept property b). For all a 2 ∈ (A 2 \ A 3 ), we have Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 ) ∩ W = ∅ and Succ(s, ξ ǫ 1 , a 2 ) ∩ U = ∅.
• (Accept property c). For all a 1 ∈ (A 1 \ Supp(ξ ǫ 1 )), there exists an action a 2 in (A 2 \ A 3 ) such that Succ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) ∩ W = ∅.
• (Accept property d). The set A 3 is largest in the sense that for all a 2 ∈ (A 2 \ A 3 ) and for all parametrized distributions ξ ǫ 1 over A 1 , the Equation 1 cannot be satisfied, while satisfying actions in A 2 using Equation 1, or Equation 2, or Equation 3, for any X, Y, Z such that U ⊆ Y ⊆ Z ⊆ X ⊆ W .
The computation of LPre(s, W, U, A 1 , A 2 ) will be done similar to the computation of the similar named LPre(s, W, U ) in [13, 9] , and we will follow notations from [9] . We will use the two methods Stay and Cover, defined as follows: The algorithm for LPre(s, W, U ) of [13, 9] can be obtained as a special case of our description above as follows:
1. Let (A 3 , ξ ǫ 1 ) ← LPre(s, W, U, Γ 1 (s), Γ 2 (s)). If either (i) LPre(s, W, U, Γ 1 (s), Γ 2 (s)) rejects; or (ii) A 3 = Γ 2 (s), then return reject, otherwise return accept and ξ ǫ 1 .
We will now show that LPre(s, W, U, A 1 , A 2 ) satisfies the desired properties. 2 ) ∩ X = ∅ (because X ⊆ W and if W is reached with positive probability, then X is reached with positive probability). Moreover, Equation 1 cannot be satisfied either, since a ′ 2 ∈ A 4 . Thus we have a contradiction.
Thus, in all cases we reach contradiction and, hence Accept property d is satisfied. The desired result follows.
